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CALIFORNIA UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
AND THE COMMON LAW
James Chapman
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advance of American society into the computer age,
trade secret protection of commercially valuable information has
become increasingly important. As a result of the speed of techno-
logical advancement, modem processes and technologies become
obsolete much more quickly, thereby contributing to the increase in
industrial spying, theft and misappropriation of trade secrets.1 Due
to the high cost of research and development, and the intensity of
competition, knowledge has become a critical asset.2
Trade secret law has become the primary means of protecting
computer technology, especially software.3 Patent and copyright
law are alternative options for protecting technology; however,
most companies choose trade secret protection. For instance, while
an estimated one million programs are developed annually, only
1205 programs were registered with the Copyright Office between
1964 and 1976, with IBM and Burroughs accounting for over sev-
enty-five percent of this number. During the four year period be-
Copyright © 1986 James Chapman. All Rights Reserved.
1. Hofer, Business Warfare Over Trade Secrets, 9 LITIGATION 8 (1983).
2. Id. In industries such as those that manufacture compatible computers, companies
constantly modify designs to remain compatible with the leader. This market pressure, for
example, enticed officials of Mitsubishi and Hitachi to risk industrial espionage. Because
IBM was producing a new computer operating system, both companies had to modify the
design of their products to maintain compatibility. Normally such modifications would re-
quire six months to a year to complete. Rather than fall behind, Hitachi and Mitsubishi
attempted to steal the information.
Such competitive pressures, which force the largest industrial concerns to commit illegal
acts, have even more impact on smaller companies that do not have the resources to engage in
the extensive research and development done by their larger competitors. Id. at 8.
3. Note, Trade Secret Protection of Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 77, 84
(1984); see also Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 909
(1970).
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tween 1976 to 1980 only 2000 programs were registered.4
Thus far, patent law has been unable to adapt to the technolog-
ical advances of the last two decades and has been inadequate in
protecting computer software. First, most software is not patenta-
ble.' Second, the registration process can take more than two
years,6 while the life expectancy of most programs is often shorter.
Third, obtaining a patent can be an expensive process.7
Although copyright law may provide greater protection for
computer programs and manuals than patent law, it too has draw-
backs. First, copyright law requires that the work be original.'
This requirement is, however, considered fairly easy to meet. Origi-
nality has been considered to mean only that the work owes its ori-
gin to the author and is not a copy of another's work. 9 Second,
copyright protection extends to the expression of the idea and not to
the idea itself.1" This distinction causes confusion when the idea
and the expression are inseparable.1 In such situations only exact
4. RosE, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, 352-81 (1981).
5. REMER, LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR SOFTWARE, 8, 126-27 (1982). See also 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-03 (1984).
These sections require that the invention be novel (different from previously known pro-
grams) and nonobvious to an ordinary skilled programmer (it cannot be just a logical exten-
sion in the art of programming). The nature of software will most often cause it to fail these
requirements.
6. REMER, supra note 5, at 8. Computer programs are generally quite complex and,
consequently, patent applications become quite complex and involve many hours of a patent
examiner's time.
7. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1984). To maximize protection and minimize frustra-
tion a patent lawyer is required to handle the paper work and define the scope of the product.
The cost of drafting the application and necessary documents can be as much as $2,000 or
more and the application fee is $300. Further, once the patent is granted, renewal fees are
required every three and one half, seven and one half and eleven and one half years. These
renewal fees can total $2,400 for maintaining a patent its full 17 year life.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides in part that "copyright protection subsists.., in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." (emphasis added). See also infra note 9 and
accompanying text.
9. Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971). The court
held that originality sufficient for copyright protection exists if the author has introduced any
element of novelty as contrasted with material known to him.
10. Sid & Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977). This principle serves to limit the extent of copyright protection.
It attempts to reconcile two competing social interests: rewarding an individual's creativity
and effort while at the same time permitting the public to enjoy the benefits of using the same
subject matter. Id. at 1163.
11. Id. "The real task in a copyright infringement action, then, is to determine whether
there has been copying of the expression of an idea rather than just the idea itself .... The
difficulty comes in attempting to distill the unprotected idea from the protected expression."
Id.
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copying can be prohibited. 2
The deficiencies of patent and copyright protection of high-
technology and the need for clear and comprehensive trade secret
protection led to the adoption of the California Uniform Trade
Secrets Act (hereafter referred to as the "California Act").13 This
comment will analyze the effect of the California Act upon common
law trade secret protection that existed in California at the time of
its enactment. First, the foundation of common law trade secret
protection in California, together with its deficiencies will be set
forth. Second, the California Act's attempt to solve these problems
will be discussed. Finally, the California Act's effect on trade secret
litigation is examined.
II. THE FOUNDATION OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE DEFICIENCIES OF
THE COMMON LAW
A. The Common Law Definition of Trade Secret
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as "any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 4
Although the definition is broad it is limited in three ways. First, a
trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the opera-
tion of a business. 5 Second, only information not generally known
in the particular trade or business can be protected,16 and third, the
owner must exercise reasonable diligence to prevent the disclosure
of trade secret information. 7 Under common law, liability rests
upon a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which
generally consists of either a breach of contract, abuse of confi-
dence, or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret. '
With the increase in complexity and diversity of technology the
weaknesses in the common law have become apparent. Trade
12. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971),
"[w]hen the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not
be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly
of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner ...."
13. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1986).
14. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See generally RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 757 comments f through j (1939).
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secrets have been described as extraordinarily difficult to define. 19
Over the years, courts have declared chemical formulas,20 industrial
processes, 21 pricing information22 and customer lists23 to be trade
secrets. Business ideas,24 layouts25 and "know how"26 have not
been afforded such protection. Consequently, it is often difficult to
determine what is protected by trade secret law. The line dividing
pricing information from business "know how," for example, is far
from clear. Therefore, to insure protection, companies attempt to
protect everything that could possibly be a trade secret. 27 Nor-
mally, a list of company secrets is given to an employee with a non-
disclosure agreement. The employee is forbidden to disclose any
information on the list, although much of it may not constitute
trade secret information, or a confidential relationship may not exist
between the employer and employee. 28  This arrangement is not
helpful to the employer since the parties to a contract cannot agree
to give certain information trade secret status, when in fact it is not
within the common law definition.29
19. See, eg., Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1974). (In
defining a trade secret, the court stated "[clomment b to section 757 of the Restatement of
Torts is the most lucid attempt to date to define the elusive beast.") Id. at 812.
20. See Platinum Prod. Corp. v. Berthold, 280 N.Y. 752, 211 N.E. 520 (1939) (a secret
chemical formula was a protectable trade secret). For an exhaustive list of cases concerning
items that do or do not constitute trade secrets, see MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS §§ 2.09(l)-(8)
(1978).
21. See Sun Dial Corp. v. Ride Out, 29 N.J. Super. 361, afid, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A. 2d
442 (1954). Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin defendants, former employees, from using or
disclosing a secret process for manufacturing precision dials and panels learned by defendants
while employed by the plaintiff.
22. See Simmons Hardware v. Waibel, I S.D. 488, 47 N.W. 814 (1891).
23. See Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 189
A.2d 390 (1963).
24. See Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1976).
25. See Arco Indus. Corp. v. Chemcast Corp., 633 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1980). The court
stated that a layout and approach to producing grommets were not protectable where plain-
tiff did not specifically show what it claimed as protectable was in any way novel. Id. at 442.
26. See Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 488 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The knowledge
that a front discharge concrete mixer was a worthwhile product and that it was potentially
profitable was not a proper subject of trade secret protection. The general knowledge of a
manufacturer including his know how is not protectable as a trade secret. Id. at 600.
27. Motorola v. Fairchild Camera & Instru. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (D. Ariz.
1973). In a suit by Motorola against a former employee and his new employer, Motorola
initially claimed there were 140 alleged trade secret items covering virtually every step in the
semiconductor manufacturing process. By the time of trial, Motorola had reduced the
number to ten.
28. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. This method is an attempt by the
employer to prevent the employee from disclosing anything that has potential value. See
generally Motorola v. Fairchild Camera and Instru. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz.
1973).
29. Ingrassia v. Bailey, 172 Cal. App. 2d 117, 122, 341 P.2d 370, 375 (1959).
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Furthermore, in Gabriel v. Talley Industries,0 the court held
that the "fruits" of the type of "generalized research" going into
research and development contracts in which the product has not
yet crystalized were not protectable as trade secrets.31 Hence, the
section of industry that encompasses research and development
may not be afforded trade secret protection.
Common law decisions that refuse to recognize trade secret
protection in certain instances are based on several factors. First, it
is not the idea alone that is valuable but the capacity to put the idea
to productive use.3 2 It is only by productive use that the idea gener-
ates income and benefits individuals. Without the ability to gener-
ate income there is no value and therefore no protection.
Second, it is difficult to know if an idea will ever be on the
market and offer the owner a competitive advantage. Therefore, the
idea is not protectable.33 The value lies in the right to exploit the
idea and without exploitation there can be no advantage over other
competitors.34
Finally, some courts refuse trade secret protection to precom-
mercial ideas because they fear that allowing protection will confer
a monopoly over research and development in a particular area.
35
Such a monopoly will restrict competition and at the same time
benefit no one.36
B. Common Law Misappropriation
Under common law principles, misappropriation occurs when
the trade secret has been acquired by improper means such as gain-
30. 137 U.S.P.Q. 630 (D. Ariz. 1963). See also Epstein v. Dennison Manuf. Co., 164
U.S.P.Q. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
31. Gabriel, 137 U.S.P.Q. at 633.
32. Moore v. Ford Motor Corp., 28 F.2d 529, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1928). Where one imparts
a mere idea to another and that one acts upon it and profits thereby, he is not liable for the
profits derived. In this case, the plaintiff disclosed an idea for a car purchasing plan whereby
the buyer would pay weekly installments, defendant was not held liable for misappropriating
the idea.
33. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 909-11 (Ct. CI.
1961).
34. Id. The tax court determined that the transfer of a trade secret was a disposition
and taxable as income. To reach this conclusion the court had to analyze trade secret law to
determine whether the transfer of a trade secret was equivalent to a sale. Since the owner
gives up the right to use the secret and prevent disclosure the transferee receives more than
information. The transferee obtains a competitive advantage and a means for exploitation and
reward.
35. See cases cited in Kane, Limitations on The Law of Trade Secrets, 53 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y. 152, 168-69 (1971).
36. Id. at 169.
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ing knowledge through fraud,37 use of surreptitious means,38 or par-
ticipation in a wrongful conspiracy.39 "A complete catalogue of
improper means is not possible.4 ° In general they are means which
fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality
and reasonable conduct.
4 1
In E.i du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher42 the court
failed to concisely define misappropriation. The court in Christo-
pher held that the owner of a trade secret is required to take reason-
able precautions to maintain secrecy,4 3  but failed to define
"reasonable precautions." Moreover, reverse engineering was not
clearly distinguished from improper discovery. 44 By refusing to
develop a clear definition of misappropriation, the holding in Chris-
topher failed to promulgate means for deterring development of new
and more sophisticated techniques for appropriating trade secrets.
In addition to misappropriation by improper means, misappro-
priation occurs when there is a breach of a confidential relation-
ship.45 The area of employer-employee relations is in the midst of a
37. See Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 56 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1932). Defendant's new
car model had many features that were found in plaintiff's plans, which had previously been
rejected by defendant. The plaintiff sued and the court held that one whose plans, communi-
cated in confidence to a manufacturer and subsequently used by that manufacturer, was enti-
tled to damages.
38. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971). The court held
that the use of aerial photography over the unfinished plant of another constitutes an im-
proper means of obtaining information.
39. See Harrington v. Nat'l Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 196 S.W.2d 786
(1946). The court held defendants liable for conspiracy to appropriate a trade secret and
wrongful appropriation after defendant entered into a contract with the plaintiff, breached
the contract, appropriated the trade secret and then obtained a patent on it.
40. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), reh'g denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971).
41. Id. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment f (1939).
42. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971), reh'g denied, 401
U.S. 967 (1971).
43. Id. The court also stated that discovery of a competitor's process by reverse engi-
neering or independent research was permissible. However, one may not take the process
from another without his consent when he is taking precautions to maintain its secrecy. Id. at
1015.
44. Id. The court stated "[to obtain knowledge of a process without spending the time
and money to discover it independently is improper unless the holder voluntarily discloses it
or fails to take reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy." Id.
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757 (b), (c), & (d) (1939), provide in part:
[o]ne who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so
is liable to the other if...
b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him
by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it
was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that
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policy conflict. One line of argument suggests a corporation should
be protected against unfair competition stemming from the usurpa-
tion of its trade secrets." On the other hand, a former employee
should have the right to be unhampered in the pursuit of an occupa-
tion for which he is most suited.47 Therefore, the general rule is
that an employee may take with him general skills and knowledge
acquired during his former employment.4" This rule is based upon
the premise that "equity has no power to compel a man who
changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory."' 9
In Futurecraft v. Clary Corp.,5° the court adopted a standard to
deal with the policy conflicts:
Protection should be afforded when, and only when, the informa-
tion in question has value in the sense that it affords the plaintiff
[i.e., ex-employer] a competitive advantage over competitors who
do not know of it [i.e., the trade secret], and where the granting of
such protection will not unduly hamstring the ex-employee in the
practice of his occupation or profession. 51
Although the Futurecraft test aids in discerning the scope of
misappropriation and improper disclosure, the test fails to set a pre-
cise standard for what information can be used by an ex-employee.
This problem is readily apparent in cases such as Schulenberg
v. Signatrol52 and Digital Development Corp. v. International Mem-
ory Systems.53 The employee knows neither what information con-
stitutes a trade secret nor the parameters of the confidential
relationship.
In Schulenberg, the defendants memorized plaintiff's plans and
drawings. The court held that having a mental picture of trade
the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the
other, or
d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
46. Futurecraft v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962).
47. Id. at 286, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
48. Schulenberg v. Signatrol, 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E. 2d 865 (1965). The court also
attempted to distinguish between general and specific knowledge. However, this approach is
only of limited value because the line separating the two is often difficult to determine.
49. Peerless Patton Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 132 N.Y.S. 37 (1956), quoted with ap-
proval in Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 266 (S.D. Cal. 1958),
affd, 283 F.2d 695 (1960), cerL denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961). The law encourages competi-
tion in not only creativeness, but in economy of manufacture and distribution as well.
50. 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962).
51. Id. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211, quoting von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade
Secrets, 47 VA. L. REv. 583, 599 (1961).
52. 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
53. 185 U.S.P.Q. 136 (1973).
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secrets was no different than having a copy on paper.54  The de-
fendants obtained the mental pictures while employed by the plain-
tiff, and carrying away these pictures in this manner was held to be
a violation of the confidence reposed in them by their employer.
The court found that defendants were not using the skill they had
obtained, but were actually copying and carrying away trade
secrets.-
5
Schulenberg implies that an employee who has been exposed
for a period of time to trade secrets may not later work for a com-
petitor in his field of expertise. Since the employee's mind is full of
information, he could not avoid using that information while work-
ing on a similar project for a different employer. This case clearly
limits an employee's mobility and right to exercise his ability.
Digital Development extends the Schulenberg ruling to infor-
mation which is not necessarily a trade secret. 56 As long as a confi-
dential relationship exists, disclosure of information is prohibited.57
Although this principle has been applied only by this court, it nev-
ertheless may be an obstacle severely limiting the employee.
It is presumed that if a confidential relationship existed, the
employee knew or should have known the information disclosed
was a trade secret. 5' However, even if an employee knew a confi-
dential relationship existed, it is often difficult to distinguish infor-
mation that is a trade secret from information that is not.5 9
Therefore, the common law places an unfair burden on the
employee.
54. 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965).
[lit should, moreover, make no difference whether the information contained
in the blueprints, if qualified as a trade secret. . ., had been pilfered by tracing
the blueprints themselves.. ., or has been memorized by someone with a pho-
tographic memory, or has been committed to memory by constant exposure to
the prints while in the employ of the plaintiff."
Id. at 382, 212 N.E.2d at 869.
55. Id.
56. Digital Development Corp. v. Int'l Memory Sys., 185 U.S.P.Q. 136, 141 (1973).
Although all given information is not a trade secret, one who receives the information in a
confidential relationship is under a duty not to disclose or use the information. See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
57. Digital Development Corp., 185 U.S.P.Q. at 141.
58. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, §§ 3.02(l)(d), 3.05(1)(a) (1978). Where the protection
for alleged trade secrets is asserted to be the purpose of a nondisclosure agreement, the major-
ity rule appears to be that the firm does not need to prove the existence of trade secrets
although a showing of some element of secrecy or confidentiality seems to be necessary. Id.
at 3-105.
59. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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C. Monetary Damages: The Battle Between Lost Profits and
Profits of the Misappropriator
Monetary damages are allowed in trade secret litigation under
the theories of breach of contract and breach of confidential rela-
tionship.60 In Telex v. IBM,6 ' the court summarized the present
state of monetary damages by declaring: "[U]nfortunately the gen-
eral law as to the proper measure of damages in a trade secrets case
is far from uniform." 62
One approach is to measure damages by the amount of loss to
the plaintiff.6 3 In Sperry Rand v. ATO, Inc.,' the court analyzed
the lost profits proximately caused by ATO's misappropriation and
held that fixed overhead costs and material overhead costs were re-
coverable. 65  Additionally, there was evidence that Sperry Rand
could have expected future contracts for spare parts representing
twenty five percent of the total amount of the original contract.
The court allowed recovery for this amount.6 6
Another approach measures damages by the amount of profits
earned by the misappropriator from the use of the appropriated
trade secret.67 Generally, this method is used when defendant's
conduct has been particularly willful or fraudulent, and plaintiff's
actual loss is difficult to measure.68 When assessing the benefits ac-
crued by the misappropriator of trade secrets, courts apply the
"standard of comparison test."' 69 This test compares the costs in-
curred by the defendant in using the secret to the costs that would
have been incurred by the defendant had the trade secret not been
60. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment e (1939).
61. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
62. Id. at 930.
63. See Sperry Rand Corp. v. ATO, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (4th Cir. 1971). Since
the objective in allowing damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the difference in his posi-
tion before and after the misappropriation of his trade secret, his probable loss may be more
significant than the misappropriator's gain.
64. 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971).
65. Id. at 1393-94.
66. Id.
67. Int'l Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1957). The
Third Circuit declared, by analogy to patent infringement, "[the appropriate measure of
damages, by analogy to patent infringement is not what the plaintiff lost but rather the bene-
fits, profits, or advantage gained by the defendant in use of the trade secret."
Where gaps exist in trade secret law it is not unusual to find authorities using the patent
analogy; see also University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1974).
68. Int'l Indus. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d at 699. This is significant because
at times the misappropriator's gain is more than the plaintiff's loss.
69. Id.
19861
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misappropriated.7" The difference between the costs, which is the
benefit accrued to the defendant, is the measure of damages.71
Neither method for measuring damages recognizes the dimin-
ished value of the trade secret resulting from the potential loss of its
trade secret status. Moreover, it may be extremely difficult to mea-
sure the lost profits of the plaintiff when his product is new and an
adequate record of sales and production has not been developed.72
It may prove equally difficult to measure the defendant's profits be-
cause its revenue is derived from a variety of products on the mar-
ket and the time required for reverse engineering is in dispute.
The modem trend is to allow whatever form of relief is neces-
sary to compensate the plaintiff for his losses.73 This appears to
have developed out of the policy that plaintiff should be made
whole, yet there should be no double recovery.74 Such a policy in-
creases the court's flexibility in awarding damages and eases the
burden on the plaintiff because he can recover using either method.
D. Injunctions: The Split Between Shellmar and
Conmar Products
Due to the difficulty in translating creative genius, inventive
insights and energy of purpose into monetary damages, injunctive
relief is the most common remedy. However, courts are split over
the duration of the injunction.75
In Shellnar Products v. Allen Qualley Co.,76 the court granted
a permanent injunction to punish the defendant for his breach of
trust. 77 Punishment of the misappropriator is manifested by al-
lowing the duration of the injunction to extend beyond the point at
which the plaintiff loses the competitive advantage.7 8 The point at
which the advantage is lost is when the product enters the market
70. Id. at 701-02.
71. Id.
72. This situation can occur because the line dividing speculative and nonspeculative
damages is not clear. The problem is not restricted to damages in trade secret law but to all
areas of law.
73. Telex v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 931 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 802 (1975). (The common thread in all of the damage cases is the attempt to make the
plaintiff whole.)
74. Id. See also Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
75. An exhaustive history of the Shellmar and Conmar lines of cases can be found in
TURNER, LAW oF TRADE SECRETS 427-58 (1962).
76. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695 (1937).
77. Id. at 108.
78. Id. at 109-10.
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and potential competitors obtain a similar product by reverse engi-
neering or other means.
However, in Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide Fast-
ener,79 the court ruled that no injunction may be issued after the
trade secret has been publicly disclosed.8 ° The Conmar rule maxi-
mizes the freedom of employment choices among skilled workers
and promotes the dissemination of knowledge by recognizing the
unlimited right to use publicly disclosed ideas."1 The rule places a
minimum burden on the employee at the expense of protecting the
employer.
Although the two lines of cases affect the respective parties dif-
ferently, both rules are severe. The Conmar rule is clearly harsh in
that once secret information is publicly disclosed it automatically
ends all rights to an injunction. The Conmar court recognizes the
policy of trade secret law that allows protection of secrecy and no
more.
8 2
The Shellmar rule is equally harsh (although to the defendant
instead of the plaintiff) for it focuses on punishment and not on the
reality of the economic situation. Shellmar allows a permanent in-
junction because the plaintiff has an action for breach of confidence
and the intervening public disclosure of the trade secret does not
deprive him of the injunction. 3 Furthermore, Shellmar is based on
the premise that once a misappropriated secret becomes public, the
wrongdoer should not be allowed to assert that he is not using the
wrongfully appropriated material but rather knowledge picked up
in the public domain. 4
Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co. 85 represents the modem trend of issuing temporary injunctions
against trade secret misappropriators for a period of time approxi-
mate to that which it takes to develop a successful product after it is
79. 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949).
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id. The Conmar view is supported by a number of policy arguments. First, society
has a fundamental interest in allowing the individual to change his employment for whatever
reason he wishes and to make full use of his general skills, knowledge and experience for his
new employer. Second, free competition and dissemination of ideas are enhanced by allowing
such persons reasonable mobility.
82. TURNER, supra note 75, at 453.
83. Id. at 454.
84. Id. at 423.
85. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965). "A permanent injunction would subvert the public's
interest in allowing technical employees to make full use of their knowledge and skill in
fostering research and development. On the other hand, denial of any injunction at all would
leave the faithless employee unpunished .... " Id. at 142. Here, the court formulates a
compromise between the different approaches of Shellmar and Conmar.
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disclosed to the public.86 Temporary injunctions minimize the bur-
den on employees who are trying to market their skills while at the
same time placing the owner of the trade secret in the position he
would have been in had the disclosure not occurred. 7 The Winston
approach to injunctions has created an appropriate compromise be-
tween the extreme positions of earlier opinions. However, different
approaches are used88 and courts are free to vacillate between them.
III. THE CALIFORNIA UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
The policy underlying trade secret protection is that the law
seeks to encourage invention of new products, processes and tech-
nologies and to allow the inventor to exploit his or her invention.
Society benefits from the creation of new technologies, as they pro-
vide the public with a steady stream of new and better products.
New technology increases operating efficiency, promotes growth
and rejuvenates the national economy. Without some adequate
means for protecting such information the harm to society would be
immeasurable.89
Considering the rationale behind trade secret protection and
the patchwork of conflicting common law doctrines, the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act (Uniform Act). The Uniform Act seeks to codify basic princi-
ples of common law trade secret protection, resolve issues decided
inconsistently by the courts and promote uniformity, simplicity and
fairness.9" The California Legislature, seeing the need for such an
act adopted a modified version of the Uniform Act (California Act).
86. Id. See also Telex v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 802 (1975).
87. Id. See also K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski CO., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974). The
court applied the Winston formula in a different situation when it enjoined defendants from
using the base subassembly trade secret for two years and the surfacing veil secret for one
year. "We are satisfied that the appropriate duration for the injunction should be the period
of time it would have taken Head, either by reverse engineering or by independent develop-
ment, to develop it's ski legitimately without use of the K-2 trade secrets." Id. at 474.
88. Shellmar was the majority doctrine up until the mid 1960's. See generally Schnei-
der & Halstrom, Trade Secret Protection in Massachusetts, 56 MAss. L.Q. 239, 258 (1971).
89. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1981). Since com-
panies could forsake research and development and appropriate other company's new devel-
opments, there would be no economic incentive to develop new products and processes.
Therefore, trade secret protection plays a part in the technological advancement of the
country.
90. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 537-40 (commissioners prefatory note,
1980).
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A. Trade Secrets: An Economic Solution
to Definitional Uncertainty
The California Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("California
Act")9 1 as defined by the California Legislature defines a trade se-
cret as information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, pro-
gram, device, method, technique or process that 1) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
known to the public or persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and 2) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
92
The California Act broadens the common law definition of
trade secret 93 and combines the concepts of trade secrets and busi-
ness information94 . By utilizing the words "method" and "tech-
nique" to include business "know how", 95 the California Act
eliminates the problems of distinguishing "know how" from trade
secrets.96 Under the California Act, the central issues are the defini-
tion of "competitive advantage" and the degree of advantage
needed to invoke protection. 97  Although the California Act pro-
vides little guidance for defining competitive advantage or what de-
gree of advantage is mandated for protection, its economic
foundation simplifies trade secret law conceptually. The amount of
effort and money used to develop the information, the role of such
information in the business, and the desirability of this information
to competitors which are the components of competitive advantage
have become the focal points in ascertaining trade secrets.
Moreover, the California Act eliminates the requirement that
information be used continually in the operation of the business.98
Consequently, protection is extended to ideas that have not yet
91. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 et seq. (West Supp. 1986).
92. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1986).
93. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
94. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). California adopted the
model Act's definition of trade secret which specifically attempted to broaden the common
law definition.
95. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 543.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1986). See also supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1986). No longer will information have
to fit into certain categories or be excluded from protection. As long as the information
bestows a competitive advantage upon the owner over competitors who do not know of it and
remains secret it receives protection.
98. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 543. The definition of trade
secret contains a reasonable departure from the Restatement of Tort's definition which re-
quired a trade secret be "continuously used in the business." See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1986).
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reached the market (i.e., products at the developmental stage).99
Since trade secret protection does not convey a monopoly over the
idea but only protects against usurpation by improper means, 1°° the
Act will not place an unhealthy burden on competition. For exam-
ple, results of research and development are not limited to the first
company that discovers an idea. 101 The information obtained from
research gives the owner a competitive advantage because it affords
him a headstart over competitors.1 0 2 Such information in the hands
of a misappropriator would save him the time and money of starting
from scratch. The expenses which normally would have been allo-
cated to develop an idea which could be channeled into other
projects thereby compounding the advantage. For the lawful owner
of the trade secret, the gain of commercial advantage creates an
economic use by allowing him to remain ahead of the competition.
The California Act clearly recognizes and remedies the harshness of
the common law which does not recognize the advantage of a
headstart. 10 3
The California Act extends protection to information that is
meant to be used only once."° Allowing protection of this type of
information should not have a major impact on industry. However,
recognizing that such information can have economic value is sig-
nificant because it can be important to a business and its
competitors. 105
The California Act further broadens the concept of economic
value by including in the definition of trade secret, information that
99. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1986).
101. Kane, supra note 35, at 170-71. Kane argues that public policy prevents the exten-
sion of protection to the area of research and development. However, since two indepen-
dently working parties can have trade secret protection in the same item, there is no danger of
plaintiff's locking up an entire field of research and development through injunctive relief.
See REMER, supra note 5, at 20.
102. F.W. Dodge Co. v. Constr. Info. Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903). The court
held that early possession of information is valuable in itself.
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (d) (West Supp. 1986).
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETs AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 542 (1980). The common law use rule is too harsh. For
example, an entrepreneur has an idea but lacks the necessary resources to market the idea. If
another individual misappropriates the secret he may escape liability because the idea was not
continually used in the operation of the business.
105. For example, many corporations set prices, product lines and production levels in
relation to what other companies are doing. Thus, a current status report is valuable to a
competitor because he would be able to predict the short term future of another's business in
a particular area and react accordingly. See P. SOLMAN & T. FREIDMAN, LIFE AND DEATH
ON THE CORPORATE BATTLEFIELD 128-37 (1982).
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has commercial value from a negative viewpoint. 106 The results of
lengthy and expensive research that proves a certain process will
not work is an example of negative information. This type of infor-
mation can be of enormous value to the competitor and conse-
quently, is afforded protection. The California Act's focus on the
competitive advantage bestowed upon the owner of such informa-
tion simplifies the analysis by allowing the economic value of the
information determine whether it is a trade secret.
107
The California Act departs from the Uniform Act by dropping
the phrase "not being readily ascertainable by proper means" from
the definition of trade secret. 108 The Uniform Act states that infor-
mation is readily ascertainable if it is known within a particular in-
dustry or available in trade journals, reference books or published
materials. 0 9 It requires the determination of whether a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art could employ the information to derive
the secret.1'0 If an individual could locate and use such informa-
tion, protection under the Uniform Act is unavailable.
Under the California Act, a court may focus on the fundamen-
tal principles of improper means and breach of confidence regard-
less of whether a misappropriator could have learned the trade
secret through diligent research."' Therefore, under the California
Act a person who employs commercially immoral means to obtain a
trade secret may be held liable without regard to whether the trade
secret was "readily ascertainable." Prior to the California Act, a
person who employed reprehensible means to obtain information
could not be held liable if the information could be found some-
where in the pubic domain." 2
B. Misappropriation: A Simplification of the Common Law
Under the California Act, misappropriation is divided into the
categories of improper means and breach of confidential relation-
ship."' The California Act defines improper means to include
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West Supp. 1986). See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 543 (1980).
107. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 543 (1980).
108. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West Supp. 1986); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(1939).
109. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 543 (1980).
110. Id.
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West Supp. 1986).
112. Gabriel v. Talley Indus., 137 U.S.P.Q. 630, 633 (D. Ariz. 1963).
113. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West Supp. 1986). Misappropriation means:
1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has rea-
son to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
1986]
404 COMPUTER & HIGH-TECHNOLOGYLAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2
"theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through elec-
tronic or other means." '14 Reverse engineering or independent der-
ivation are expressly distinguished from improper means.' 15
This formulation is merely a codification of the common
law. 116 However, the inclusion of "other means"117 of misappropri-
ation gives the courts flexibility in adapting the statute to more inge-
nious techniques of misappropriation. Aside from reverse
engineering and independent derivation, proper means include dis-
covery under license from the owner, discovery by public observa-
tion or while on public display, and discovery from published
literature. 118
The California Act, like the common law, relies on commercial
ethics as the general standard for trade secret law" 9 and improper
acts are determined on an ad hoc basis by applying the notion of
commercial fair play and integrity.' 20
The California Act is broader than the common law concern-
ing breach of confidential relationship. 2' Under common law, the
trade secret owners must have knowingly reposed confidence in the
person who first acquired the secret. 122 The California Act imposes
liability regardless of how the duty to maintain secrecy arose or
whether the trade secret owner knew the circumstances of the
2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who:
A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
B) At the time of disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his
or her knowledge of a trade secret was:
i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means
to acquire it;
ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its uses; or
C) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to
know it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West Supp. 1986).
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West Supp. 1986).
118. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1, 14 U.L.A. at 542 (1980).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS
AcT, 14 U.L.A. 537, 545-46 (1980).
120. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS AcT § 2, 14 U.L.A. at 545-46 (1980).
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(ii) (West Supp. 1986).
122. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
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duty. 123
As a result, it may be easier for the courts to imply the exist-
ence of a confidential relationship under the California Act. The
California Act does not specifically address trade secret law in em-
ployer-employee relations," 4 but the broadening of the "breach of
confidence" concept runs counter to the policy of encouraging free-
dom of employment opportunities and mobility. The California
Act allows courts to find confidential relationships in more cases
and to restrict the information an employee may take with him to
his new employment. The broadening of the definitions of trade
secret and breach of confidence allows more protection for the em-
ployer at the expense of the employee.
The California Act again departs from the common law and its
literal conferring of absolute immunity upon all third parties who
have paid value in good faith for a trade secret misappropriation by
another. 125 Under the California Act an unauthorized user of a
trade secret will be liable from the point he learns the information is
a trade secret, provided that the purchaser has not materially
changed his position before learning the information is a trade
secret. 126
In addition to redefining misappropriation, the California Act
approaches the concept in a different manner. Under common law
principles, misappropriation of a trade secret was based on tort law
or contract law depending on whether there was a use of improper
means or a breach of duty to maintain secrecy. 127 This distinction
led the courts to focus on different theories as the basis for the ac-
tion. The California Act dispenses with the distinction between
contractual and tortious misappropriation by providing a new dis-
tinct cause of action.128 Therefore, the Act eliminates statute of
limitations disputes and damage questions which were prevalent at
common law.12
9
Although the California Act's definition of misappropriation
solves some of the ambiguities of common law in this area, the defi-
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(ii) (West Supp. 1986).
124. Id.
125. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1986).
126. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1986).
127. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); No. Pe-
trochemical v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 (1939).
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b) (West Supp. 1986).
129. Id.
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nition remains complex.130 There still exists the problem of making
the facts in question fit the definition and presenting the case in an
understandable form to a jury. The definition of misappropriation
is lengthy.131 A lengthy statute can be difficult to understand, espe-
cially when further obfuscated by definitional ambiguities.
C. Damages: Adoption of the Modern Trend
The California Act allows a complainant to recover damages
for the actual loss caused by the misappropriation of his trade
secrets. 132 Additionally, the complainant "may recover for the un-
just enrichment caused by the misappropriation"1 33 of his trade
secrets. "If neither damages nor unjust enrichment caused by mis-
appropriating are provable, the court may order payment of a rea-
sonable royalty for no longer than the period of time the use could
have been prohibited." '134
Although the California Act allows recovery for both actual
loss and unjust enrichment of the defendant, it follows present case
law by not allowing double recovery. 135 As with injunctive relief,
monetary recovery for misappropriation is appropriate only for that
period in which the misappropriator retains an advantage over good
faith competitors as a result of the misappropriation. 36
By awarding a reasonable royalty when actual loss or unjust
enrichment are too speculative, the California Act significantly de-
130. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACr, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). The North Carolina Com-
mittee on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act took a different route by making simplicity the
prime requisite of the Act. The definition of misappropriation was trimmed to include the
acquisition, disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without expressed or implied au-
thority or consent, unless such trade secret was arrived at by independent development, re-
verse engineering or was obtained from another with the right to disclose the trade secret.
The North Carolina Act also adds a section that sets out the prima facie case of misappropri-
ation and the appropriate defenses. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-152(1) (1981). For further
discussion see Root & Blynn, Abandonment of Common Law Principles: The North Carolina
Trade Secrets Protection Act, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823-55 (1982).
131. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(a) (West Supp. 1986).
133. Id. The Act states that a complainant may also recover for the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing damages for actual
loss.
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West Supp. 1986).
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(a) (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE SEC-
RETS AcT § 3, 14 U.L.A. at 547 (1980). See also Universal Computing v. Lykes-Youngstown
Corp., 504 F.2d 518, reh'g denied, 505 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Sperry Rand Corp. v. ATO Inc., 447 F.2d 1387, cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 reh'g denied, 459 F.2d 19 (4th Cir. 1971).
136. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(a) (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS AcT § 3, 14 U.L.A. at 547 (1980).
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parts from both common law and the Uniform Act.137 This formu-
lation offers flexibility in the application of remedies. Instead of
denying relief when actual loss or unjust enrichment may be too
speculative, a reasonable royalty serves as a compromise between
finding clear loss or denying relief. This change not only fills a gap
in the present system but offers a more predictable alternative.
The California Act also differs from common law by allowing
punitive damages for willful and malicious misappropriation.
138
The California Act, however, places a ceiling on the amount, limit-
ing it to twice the award. 139 Additionally, it places the determina-
tion of the award in the hands of the court and not with the jury.Y40
Determining whether a punitive award should be made by the court
or jury requires consideration of two risks: (1) the jury may ravage
a deep pocket defendant unreasonably; and (2) a court may release
a defendant who causes great loss to the plaintiff from liability be-
cause either there has been only slight damage or unjust enrichment
cannot be proved. Although this is a policy problem on which rea-
sonable minds may differ, the California Act favors the defendant
on this issue. 1
41
The California Act clearly sets the parameters on the remedies
issue. In the past, cases have differed widely in the application of
damage formulae. 42 By codifying the best reasoned cases, 143 the
California Act overcomes many of the inconsistencies existing at
common law.
D. Injunctions: Adoption of the Modern Trend
The California Act adopts the modern trend of author-
ity'alimiting the duration of injunctive relief to the extent of the
temporary advantage over good faith competitors gained by a mis-
appropriator. 45 The period is limited to the time it would have
taken the misappropriator to discover the trade secret either by in-
137. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.3(b) (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980).
138. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(c) (West Supp. 1986).
139. Id. However, the concept of willful and malicious behavior has been elusive. The
failure to give the words any meaning fosters the uncertainty the Act tries to dispel.
140. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3(c) (West Supp. 1986).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
144. Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
1965); see also K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., Inc., 506 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1974).
145. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.2 (West Supp. 1986). See also supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
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dependent development or reverse engineering of the discoverer's
product. 146
The California Act attempts to solve the conflict in situations
where the misappropriator will damage a trade secret owner, but an
injunction against future use is unreasonable under the particular
circumstances of the case.147 The California Act provides that fu-
ture use of a trade secret is conditional upon payment of a reason-
able royalty to compensate the owner for his loss and as a result the
misappropriator is prevented from being unjustly enriched.148
Like the Uniform Act, the California Act does not contemplate
permanent injunctions.149 However, the California Act provides for
relief beyond the scope of that which may have been available at
common law.150 The California Act states that affirmative acts may
be compelled by court order. 15 1 Substantial power and discretion
therefore may be placed in the court. In addition to compelling the
return of the physical embodiments of the trade secret, the court
may order the misappropriator to take definitive steps to prevent
further disclosure.152 These can include extraordinary measures
such as special directives to employees and agents or a substantial
revision of operations incorporating the misappropriated trade
secret. 153
The California Act also allows courts to enjoin threatened mis-
appropriation.1 54 However, proving a defendant has used or will
use the wrongfully acquired information can be extremely difficult
146. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2 (West Supp. 1986).
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(b) (West Supp. 1986). In Republic Aviation v. Schenk,
152 U.S.P.Q. 830 (N.Y. 1967), the court denied injunctive relief because enjoining the misap-
propriator from supplying the U.S. military with an aircraft weapons control system may
have endangered military personnel in Viet Nam.
148. CAL. CIV. CODE. § 3426.2(b) (West Supp. 1986).
149. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West Supp. 1986). See also UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 2, 14 U.L.A. at 544 (1980). The Act provides that "an injunction should last
for as long as is necessary but no longer than is necessary to eliminate the commercial advan-
tage or lead time with respect to good faith competitors that a person has obtained through
misappropriation. Subject to any additional period necessary to negate lead time, an injunc-
tion accordingly should terminate when a former trade secret becomes either generally know-
able to them because of the lawful availability of products that can be reversed engineered to
reveal trade secrets."
150. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3426.2(c) (West Supp. 1986). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 (1939), which indicates that a court can compel the surrender of physical items embod-
ying a trade secret.
151. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.2(c) (West Supp. 1986).
152. Id. See also UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, 14 U.L.A. at 546 (1980).
153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(c) (West Supp. 1986).
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West Supp. 1986).
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because direct evidence is rare.'" Consequently, as long as the
plaintiff can show that misappropriation will cause substantial in-
jury, suspicion may be enough to warrant the issuance of an
injunction.
A low standard of proof may further open the door to abuse of
process. Trade secret cases have more than doubled in the last five
years.' 5 6 Most cases hinge on the departure of ambitious executives
or engineers who start new businesses.' 57 The trade secret lawsuit
has become an effective weapon for "killing" a new company.1
5 8
The costs can be staggering and the attendant publicity and other
restrictive effects can scare away investors, customers and
employees. 159
To combat against predatory trade secret litigation, the Cali-
fornia Act provides that if a claim of misappropriation is made in
bad faith, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party.' 60 Considering the complexity of trade secret liti-
gation attorneys' fees can be considerable.' 61 Under common law
principles, courts have been reluctant to award attorneys' fees in
absence of specific statutory authority. 162
The California Act offers no guidance on what constitutes bad
faith. Therefore, courts must rely on common law. Under common
law, unnecessary, groundless, vexatious and oppressive petitions
and motions have been considered bad faith and attorneys' fees
155. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
In most cases plaintiffs must construct a web of perhaps ambiguous circum-
stantial evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which con-
vince him that it is more probable than not that what plaintiffs allege happened
did in fact take place. Against this often delicate construct of circumstantial
evidence there must be balanced defendants and defendants' witnesses who di-
rectly deny everything .... Id. at 814.
156. Dubro, Keeping Trade Secrets in Silicon Valley, CALIF. LAW., Sept. 1984, 43.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. See also SAR Indus., Inc. & Sarmax Corp. v. Monogram Indus., 1976 Trade
Cas. (C.C.H.) at 68,520 (C.D. Cal. 1976). "Through unfair trade secret litigation, the former
employer will attempt to exhaust the new competitor, suggest to customers and suppliers that
the new technology may fail and warn other employees about striking out on their own." Id.
at 68,522.
160. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.4 (West Supp. 1986). The Act provides, "if a claim for
misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an injunction is made or resisted
in bad faith ... the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party."
161. Carter Prod., Inc. v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 385, 414-15 (D. Md.
1963). In this case the court awarded $525,000 in attorneys' fees.
162. See Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc. v. Olin Mathison Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 802, 809-
13 (9th Cir. 1974). In this case the court went into an exhaustive discussion of the California
rule and its narrow limitation of attorneys' fees to statutorily defined instances.
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awarded.' 63 In actions for unfair competition such as misappropri-
ation of trade secrets, fees are assessed when a wrongdoer's conduct
is unconscionable, fraudulent, willful or exceptional. 1" By not giv-
ing substance to the concept of "bad faith," the California Act may
only be shifting the problem. In the past courts were reluctant to
award attorneys' fees without statutory authority; 165 under the Act
they may be reluctant to find "bad faith."
IV. THE CALIFORNIA ACT'S EFFECT ON LITIGATION
In addition to modifying the concepts of trade secret and mis-
appropriation and formulating a coherent theory of remedies, the
California Act will have a profound impact on the way trade secret
litigation is conducted. Before discovery commences, the complain-
ant must identify the trade secret with reasonable clarity. 166 By re-
quiring clear identification at the early stage of litigation, abuses of
discovery may be curbed since proper identification will eliminate
disputes over what trade secrets are at issue.
Another important provision in the California Act requires the
court to preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret. 167 Although
the court must safeguard confidentiality, it also must ensure that a
respondent is provided sufficient information for an adequate de-
fense and the trier of fact is provided enough information to resolve
the dispute.' 68
In addition to the illustrative techniques specified in the Cali-
fornia Act'6 9 courts have protected secrecy by restricting disclo-
sures to counsel 70 and assistants or by appointing a special master
to hear the information and report his conclusions to the court.' 71
By using these techniques the California Act ensures, by the force of
statute, that a plaintiff's trade secret will retain its secrecy. There-
163. Local 149 Int'l Union v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1962).
This case provides an extensive discussion of cases ruling on this issue.
164. Id. at 215.
165. Sperry Rand Corp. v. ATO Inc., 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971). The court denied
$225,000 for attorneys' fees on the ground that Virginia law did not authorize the award.
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2036.2 (West Supp. 1986).
167. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.3 (West Supp. 1986). In an action under this title, a court
shall preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include
granting protective orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in camera hear-
ings, sealing the records of the action and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to
disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval.
168. Id. See also UNIFORM TRADE SECRET ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. at 548-49 (1980).
169. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
170. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. 537, 548-49 (1980).
171. Id.
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fore, an injured plaintiff may be more inclined to seek redress
through the court system.
The California Act imposes a three year statute of limitations
for actions involving the misappropriation of trade secrets, 172 thus
eliminating disputes over whether the statute of limitations for tort
action or contract action should be used. 1
73
In addition, the California Act eliminates the split of authority
on the question of when the statute begins to run. One line of cases
has held that each day's use of another's trade secret by a misap-
propriator constitutes a new and discrete wrong.174 This approach
extended an injured party's right to recover for misappropriation.
A second line of authority used the date of the first use of the trade
secret as the time of misappropriation1 75 and the time period for
recovery was considerably shortened.
The California Act rejects the "continuing wrong" approach to
the statute of limitations but delays the commencement of the limi-
tation period until an aggrieved person discovers or reasonably
should have discovered the existence of misappropriation. 17 6 It
thus clarifies the date at which the statute of limitations begins to
run while recognizing the inequity resulting to trade secret owners
as a result of the mechanical operation of the first use theory.
V. CONCLUSION
Trade secret law is critically important to protect commer-
cially valuable ideas that bestow a competitive advantage upon their
owners. It deserves coherent, systematic, complete and uniform
treatment as a body of law. The California Act significantly con-
tributes toward such a goal. It clarifies and broadens the definitions
of misappropriation and trade secret. It codifies the results of the
better reasoned cases concerning remedies and offers a coherent the-
ory in this area. Finally, the California Act will have a significant
effect on litigation by uniformly providing a single statute of limita-
172. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.6 (West Supp. 1986). "An action for misappropriation
must be brought three years after the misappropriation is discovered or by the use of reason-
able diligence should have been discovered. For the purposes of this section, a continuing
misappropriation constitutes a single claim."
173. Id.
174. Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 371 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967).
175. Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d. 502, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161 (1975); Matter
of McLion, 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984); Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 736 F.2d 1341
(9th Cir. 1984); Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407
F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
176. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.6 (West Supp. 1986).
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tions, preserving the secrecy of the trade secrets, and requiring early
and specific identification of the secrets at issue.
However, the California Act is not without its drawbacks. The
definition of misappropriation is still cumbersome. Furthermore, an
injunction for threatened misappropriation may open a Pandora's
box of evils.
Overall, the California Act is an improvement upon the com-
mon law approach where, under economic pressures, industry con-
tinues to rely on trade secret protection despite the doubtful and
confused status of both common law and statutory remedies.
